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As a dedication to Walter V. Schaefer, a preeminent state court
judge, this article is addressed to state court justice. The problem it
addresses is the question of state court jurisdiction in cases that have
out-of-state elements, the problem classically associated in American
law with the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff Its purpose is to suggest
how that problem might be looked at in the future. In advancing that
suggestion, existing law is taken as a point of departure in the quest for
doctrine better suited to the exigencies of modem litigation. What is
sought is an organizing idea toward which decisional law should tend
with definite but unhurried purpose.
The substance of the idea is simply stated: state court jurisdiction
should be considered a problem of venue in a national court system
that is managed primarily by the states. Hence, a state court should be
regarded as having territorial jurisdiction of a controversy if that state
is an appropriate forum according to the criteria employed in typical
venue provisions. This thesis is not particularly bold, for it represents
only a modest extension of the law as it stands. Still, as a theory, it is a
definite alternative to the proposition that state court jurisdiction is a
• Garver Professor of Law, Yale University, B.A., Swarthmore College, 1953; LL.B., Colum-
bia University, 1954.
1 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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problem of "state sovereignty,"2 and it may yield some practical out-
comes that are different from those produced under traditional theory.
THE ROLE OF STATE COURTS IN MULTISTATE CASES
The argument in support of the theory is animated by a specific
practical consideration. This is that the court system of the United
States, considered as a whole, should be so constructed that it can pro-
vide reasonably convenient administration of justice in all litigation
arising from the country's domestic affairs. There is, of course, no
reason a priori why the court system of the United States should do
this; a legal system is not impelled to be rationally organized. For ex-
ample, there was no reason a priori why the common law forms of
action should have furthered the convenient administration of justice,
and as a matter of fact they did not, but Anglo-American jurisprudence
survived. Still, if the court system could provide reasonably convenient
administration of justice in domestic multistate litigation, that would
serve a valuable public purpose and therefore be an objective worth
pursuing. And, assuming that the objective is worthwhile, evidently it
will be realized only through the state court system.
This is because the federal court system never has been and never
will be in a position to meet that need. From the beginning, the federal
courts have labored under limitations on their effectiveness as adminis-
trators of justice in precisely the types of cases in which they could have
been most useful. These were the cases of disputes between parties
from more than one state, especially those involving several parties
from several states. In such cases, it could have been provided that
diversity would be deemed to exist if any of the parties was diverse in
citizenship from another party;3 that venue be sited in the federal dis-
trict court in which the action could most conveniently be tried;4 and
that federal process reach the parties to be joined wherever they might
2 As stated in Pennoyer v. Neff, the proposition is as follows: "The several States of the
Union ... possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public
law ... are applicable to them. One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory." 95 U.S. at 722. See
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958): "[R]estrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts . . . are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States."
Compare RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 47, Comment c (1934), treating the relation
between states in the United States as similar to the relation between the United States and other
nations with the analysis in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7, Comment a (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1978), in which interstate and international jurisdiction are assimilated, but differ-
ences are noted in the legal basis ofjurisdiction in the two situations. See Ehrenzweig, From State
Court Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue, 50 OR. L. REV. 103 (1971).
3 Cf. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967) (only minimal diversity
required under federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976)).
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976) (particularly § 1407(h), provid-
ing that actions under § 4C of the Clayton Act may be transferred to any district for pretrial and
trial).
HeinOnline -- 74 Nw. U. L. Rev.  712 1979-1980
Interstate Venue
be.5
It would have been an anachronism for such a concept to have
occurred to the draftsmen of the Judiciary Act of 1789,6 however, and
highly impolitic for them to have attempted its enactment if the idea
had occurred to them. As it was, the Judiciary Act sited venue where
the defendant might be found,7 while the Process Act implicitly limited
the territorial range of federal process to that of the state courts, 8 ie.,
the territorial limits of the state in which the federal court sat. And not
too long afterward, the Court in Strawbridge v. Curtiss9 held that diver-
sity in federal proceedings must be "complete," so that diversity juris-
diction ordinarily could not be exercised if any plaintiff was a co-citizen
of any defendant.
Although these limitations on the federal courts' potential in adju-
dicating cases involving multistate elements were of ancient lineage,
none was of a constitutional dimension. 10 In recent times, at least by
the 1950s, the idea of federal jurisdiction over such cases surely had
become politically acceptable. Serious analysts of our judicial system
argued that the federal courts should be vested with jurisdiction over
such cases, " but nothing came of it, nor will anything come of it in the
future. Diversity jurisdiction, instead of being redesigned to accommo-
date complicated multistate litigation, is apparently destined for com-
plete abolition. 12 That would not be a legal disaster; indeed, it would
surely be a sound decision to make, given the competing demands on
the federal judicial system.' 3 But the abolition of diversity jurisdiction
would give official recognition to the proposition that, in the future,
litigation with significant multistate elements will have to be adjudi-
cated in the state courts.
5 See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1125 (1969).
6 See, e.g., Milligan v. Milledge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 220 (1805); Joy v. Wirtz, 13 F. Cas. 1172
(C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 7554); Weymouth v. Boyer, 30 Eng. Rep. 414 (Ch. 1792).
7 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73.
8 Process Act, ch. 22, § 2, 1 Stat. 93 (1789). See Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134).
9 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
10 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (complete diversity
requirement is statutory only); Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) (na-
tionwide service of process); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 1978) (also upholding
nationwide service of process). See also ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BE-
TWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 437 (Supporting Memorandum B) (1969).
11 See Barrett, Venue and Service ofProcess in the Federal Courts-Suggestionsfor Reform, 7
VAND. L. REV. 608 (1954).
12 See H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. HI 1,222 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1977), and
its counterpart in the Senate, S. 2389, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S28 (daily ed. Jan. 19,
1978).
13 See Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231 (1976). But see
Association of the Bar of New York City Committee on Federal Legislation, Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction, 33 REc. 493 (1978).
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Cases of the type under consideration are a statistically insignifi-
cant component of the judicial business of the nation's court systems.
They raise problems of legal importance in our federal system, how-
ever. The legal concepts of federalism are tested not by their suffi-
ciency in solving merely routine problems, but by their sufficiency in
solving problems that are unusual yet recurrent. It is disturbing and
repugnant that the legal system of the federal union might be unequal
to the task of dealing with multistate, multiparty litigation according to
standards of procedural fairness now universally recognized. 14 But
since the federal court system apparently cannot perform this task, it
becomes the responsibility of the state court systems to do so. More
particularly, it falls to the state supreme courts and to the United States
Supreme Court to fashion the jurisdictional doctrine that will permit
the states to fulfill this responsibility.
THE DIFFICULT CASES
At this point, it will be helpful to clarify precisely the kinds of
cases that are under consideration. These cases have two basic charac-
teristics. First, they involve state law elements, wholly or predomi-
nantly, as distinct from federal law elements. Cases involving chiefly
federal law elements are the business of the federal courts; if federal
court venue and range of process are inconvenient, congressional legis-
lation can and should be amended to remedy the situation, as indeed it
sometimes has been.' 5 Second, the cases involve more than two parties
who reside in two or more states. In two-party litigation these days, a
plaintiff can usually have a forum in the place where the transaction
arose, by virtue of the "minimum contacts" rule and "long arm" stat-
utes.' 6 In some situations, through the mechanism of attachment, a
plaintiff can have a forum in the place where he himself lives; 17 at
worst, he can have a forum where the defendant can be found.'8 But in
multistate litigation, the situation can be more difficult for the plaintiff.
It is a difficulty, moreover, that implicates the fairness of the system of
administered justice. Unless the plaintiff can find a forum where the
controversy can be adjudicated in one proceeding, the controversy may
14 The principles ofjoinder that are the basis for the analysis in the text are those expressed in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, now adopted in the substantial majority of the states. See
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 9-9.53 (Interim
Pamphlet to Jurisdiction and Related Matters 1977).
15 So also it is a matter for congressional remedy if federal law be construed to restrict joinder
of claims and parties in actions that are predominantly federal in substantive character. See Ald-
inger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
16 See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 7-10 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
17 See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). See, e.g.,
O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978).
18 See, e.g., MacLeod v. MacLeod, 383 A.2d 39 (Me. 1978).
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have to be decided in pieces. Piecemeal litigation carries with it the
possibilities of repetitive, incomplete, and inconsistent adjudication.
That is, piecemeal litigation gives rise to the procedural difficulties
sought to be avoided through such procedural rules as those governing
alternative pleading, necessary parties, counterclaim, impleader, inter-
pleader, and consolidation of actions.' 9 The problem is whether rules
of jurisdiction can be conceived that secure the benefits of these rules in
cases having multistate elements.
The cases for which provision has to be made come in several pro-
cedural forms, but have a common element: they each involve at least
three parties so situated in geographical location and in alignment of
interest that all cannot be brought into a single litigation except by the
compulsion of process. It should be noted that there are situations in-
volving multiple parties and multiple states that do not involve this
element. Thus, suppose that A and B, being citizens of Illinois and
members of the same family, travel to Iowa and there suffer at the
hands of C in an automobile accident, food poisoning, conversion of
their property, usury, or whatever. A and B have the opportunity,
means, and incentive to communicate with each other, pool their re-
sources, and unify their legal strategy. Under present procedural law,
A and B can join as plaintiffs in a suit in Iowa and thus prosecute their
claims in a single forum. So also if E, being a citizen of Illinois and
travelling in Iowa, should suffer the consequences of joint or concur-
rent acts ofF and G, citizens of Iowa, E can have process against both
F and G in Iowa under present law. In both instances, there is a party
who, under traditional doctrine, might not be subject to process in
Iowa, where the transaction occurred. But in both instances, that per-
son is the injured party, and the injured party has incentive to com-
mence the action and thereby submit to the jurisdiction of the Iowa
court. Hence, the system of jurisdictional and procedural rules, operat-
ing in the milieu of party incentives, yields the result that all interested
parties are brought before a single, reasonably convenient forum. The
controversy, accordingly, can be adjudicated once and for all. That is,
the system has succeeded.
The problem cases, however, are those multiparty controversies in
which the rules in the milieu of incentives do not yield a procedurally
successful result. They involve parties so situated in geography and
interest that they cannot so readily all be brought into a single litiga-
tion. Thus, suppose the following instances:
1. P sues D to enforce an obligation that D contends is or may be
owing to C rather than P, where P, D, and C all live in different states.
Procedurally, this case could take the form of an action by P against D in
19 See generally McCoid, A Single Packagefor Multfariy Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REv. 707
(1976).
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which D objects that C should be joined as a necessary party,20 or it could
take the form of an action of interpleader by D against P and C.21
2. P sues D to enforce an obligation that D contends is or may be
owing, in whole or in part, from C to P, rather than from D to P, and
where P, D, and C live in different states. This could take the form of an
action by P against D in which D seeks to implead C.22 Or it could take
the form of an action by D against P and C for a declaratory judgment on
the parties' respective rights and liabilities concerning the obligation.
3. P sues to enforce an obligation that he contends is owed by D
and C, where D and C live in different states.23 This is essentially a vari-
ation of hypothetical 2.
4. P sues D to enforce an obligation that is similar to, and arises
from the same transaction as, an obligation that C also has against D,
where C lives in a different state from P and D. This could take the form
of an action by P and C against D. 24 If there were many persons having
claims against D in the transaction in question, the action could take the
form of a class suit by P on behalf of all persons similarly situated, in-
cluding C. 25
5. P sues to enforce a claim concerning property, located in state X,
that is inconsistent with a claim that D has to the property, where P lives
in state X but D lives in state Y. This could take the form of a quiet title
suit by P against D.2 6 If D was one of many persons having claims to the
property, it might take the form of an action by P against D, where D is
named as representative of a class consisting of such claimants. 27
There are many other variations that might be conceived. How-
ever, they would all pose this common problem: (1) There is a forum
to which at least one plaintiff will repair because he has an incentive to
litigate rather than suffer his loss or legal uncertainty without redress;
(2) In that forum, an opposing party can be subjected to service of
20 See Barer v. Goldberg, 20 Wash. App. 472, 582 P.2d 868 (1978).
21 See Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed, 357
U.S. 569 (1958). See also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
22 See Lazarow, Rettig & Sundel v. Castle Capital Corp., 63 A.D.2d 277, 407 N.Y.S.2d 490
(1978); Fantis Foods, Inc. v. Standard Importing Co., 63 A.D.2d 52, 406 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1978). But
see Mid-Continent Freight Lines, Inc. v. Highway Trailer Indus., Inc., 291 Minn. 251, 190
N.W.2d 670 (1971), where the court refused to sustain assertion of jurisdiction through impleader
over the nonresident third-party defendant.
23 See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr.
113 (1969); DeCook v. Environmental Security Corp., 258 N.W.2d 721 (Iowa 1977); State ex rel.
Sperandio v. Clymer, 568 S.W.2d 935 (Mo.), vacatedsub nom. Pemberton v. Sperandio, 439 U.S.
812 (1978); Peterson v. Ely, 279 Or. 581, 569 P.2d 1059 (1977).
24 See, e.g., Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 240 N.W.2d 814 (1976).
25 See Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1068 (1978); Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W.2d 879 (1978); Note,
Toward a Policy-Based Theory of State Court Jurisdiction Over Class Actions, 56 TEX. L. REV.
1033 (1978).
26 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Breen, 560 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). See also Schuehler
v. Pait, 239 Ga. 520, 238 S.E.2d 65 (1977).
27 See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
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process under well-established concepts of territorial jurisdiction, par-
ticularly where the defendant is a local resident or the transaction oc-
curred in the forum state; (3) But there is another party, sometimes a
person who properly should be a defendant and sometimes a person
who properly should be a plaintiff, over whom the problem of service
of process is more uncertain as the law of state territorial jurisdiction
now stands. The question thus presented, and central to this article, is
whether that state law can be reconceived to accommodate the joinder.
JURISDICTIONAL THEORY
Under the present law of state court jurisdiction, it seems pretty
clear that a defendant who is present in a state may be sued there, at
least if his presence is not merely temporary, or if the transaction arose
within the state in whole or in significant part.28 It is also clear that a
state in which a transaction occurred, in whole or in significant part,
may exercise jurisdiction over anyone who can be said to have done an
act that had foreseeable consequences within the state.29 The theory
sustaining the exercise of jurisdiction in such circumstances proceeds
on the notion that the claim is "in personam" and that there is jurisdic-
tion "over the person" of the party to be brought in. Jurisdiction
"over" that "person" is sustained if he was present or had such involve-
ment in the transaction as to satisfy the "minimum contacts" require-
ment.
The "minimum contacts" concept is notoriously supple, if not infi-
nitely so, as Kulko v. Superior Court30 reminds us. The important ques-
tion, however, is not whether the concept is elastic, but which form it
ought to be stretched upon. One form is simply to consider the sum-
moned party's connection with the state regarding the original out-of-
court transaction. That harkens back to Pennoyer v. Neff.3' Another
form is to consider the summoned party's connection to the larger legal
event consisting of the out-of-court transaction plus litigation in a sin-
gle action in a reasonably convenient court. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington32 can be read as approving that version of "minimum con-
tacts," although Hanson v. Denckla33 cannot. Moreover, the much-ne-
28 The action may be terminated on the basis of the rule of forum non conveniens, but as that
rule is usually administered, dismissal is conditioned upon the defendant's being subject to juris-
diction in some more appropriate forum. See, e.g., MacLeod v. MacLeod, 383 A.2d 39, 42-43
(Me. 1978). See Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, 61 A.D.2d 697, 403 N.Y.S.2d 931, moded, 46 N.Y.2d
197, 385 N.E.2d 1055, 415 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1978).
29 See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr.
113 (1969).
30 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
31 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
32 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
33 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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glected decision in Western Union v. Pennsylvania34 may compel
acceptance of the idea that a reasonably convenient state court has ju-
risdiction over all persons whose joinder is necessary to do consistent
justice in a multiparty, multistate controversy. Several recent state
court decisions reflect a belief that such is now the law.35
There is, however, an alternative avenue of analysis that may be
pursued in accordance with accepted doctrine. This approach proceeds
on the notion that there is a "thing" with which the forum has a con-
nection and that jurisdiction may be exercised over persons having
claims relating to this thing. Put differently, the action can be con-
ceived as one in rem in which interests of various persons in the res will
be determined. Use of such a concept seems most apt where the
"thing" is real property.36 We think of real property as necessarily hav-
ing a fixed location with which transactions concerning it have some
kind of connection. Yet, the notion that an action concerns a "thing"
has application to actions other than those involving real property. An
assimilation can be made, for example, between real property and tan-
gible personal property located in a specific place, such as a ship. We
see this being done in the classic admiralty in rem proceeding. A fur-
ther assimilation can be made between tangible personal property and
intangible personal property, such as stock in a corporation. Hence, a
stockholder's relationship to a corporation in which he has ownership
can be conceived as giving rise both to an in personam action by the
stockholder against the corporation (or vice versa), and to an in rem
proceeding to determine the interests of the stockholder and corpora-
tion in the "thing" consisting of their relationship.3 7 The status of mar-
riage has long been conceived this way.38 Furthermore, an assimilation
can be made between intangible personal property and a debt or chose
in action arising in contract. On this basis, wherever the debt can be
said to be located, jurisdiction can be exercised to determine the claims
of persons interested in the obligation. That, of course, was the theory
of such cases as Harris v. Balk39 and Pennington v. Fourth National
Bank.40
The recent decision in Shaffer v. Heitner4l does not repudiate this
way of looking at a debtor-creditor relationship. That case, it will be
recalled, held that a state may not exercise jurisdiction over a person
where the sole basis of jurisdiction is the fact that the person owned
34 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
35 See particularly cases cited in notes 22-26 supra.
36 See Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890).
37 Compare the fact situation in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
38 See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
39 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
40 243 U.S. 269 (1917).
41 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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intangible property whose situs could be attributed to the state.42 The
Supreme Court stated that jurisdiction could be exercised only if the
defendant had "minimum contacts" with the state, ie., if the transac-
tion at issue in the litigation had some kind of connection to the fo-
rum.43 But this does not constitute a rejection of the notion that
obligations can be treated for jurisdictional purposes as "things" that
are "within" a state. On the contrary, in imposing the "minimum con-
tacts" requirement on the exercise of attachment jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court may be said to have legitimated the concept of an obli-
gation as a res, while pruning away some of the more aggressive doctri-
nal tendrils associated with the concept. Put differently, Shaffer v.
Heitner can be read as meaning that we may look at a legal relation-
ship as a "thing" so long as in doing so we do not extend jurisdiction
beyond the limits of the "fair play" required by International Shoe Co.
v. Washington.44 Thus, Shaffer v. Heitner permits us to continue doing
what we have done for a long time-when it has proved convenient.
We have done so where the obligation was an ordinary contract, or of
marriage, or where it was a tort associated with a thing, as in the case of
the ship in admiralty. Moreover, there is no analytic reason why the
concept of an obligation as a "thing" cannot be generalized, so that we
may look at a tort obligation as a thing arising where the tort occurred,
a thing that is at once an unliquidated obligation in favor of the injured
person and a negative asset of the alleged tortfeasor. The forum's task
is to determine whether the liability exists and, if it does, what its mag-
nitude is. All persons having an interest in the thing can be joined,
whether they have a plaintiffs interest in the claim or a defendant's
interest in the liability.45
In the realm of pure concept, these approaches-in personam fo-
cusing on the people and in rem focusing on the event-are equally
plausible. Use of either is usually permissible in any given case, as the
Supreme Court itself has demonstrated. And if anyone thinks we have
gone through the looking glass, he should reread Seider v. Roth.46
Hence, under one conceptual approach or another, all of the problem
cases mentioned earlier could be sited in a single forum that could val-
idly exercise jurisdiction over all the absentees.
JURISDICTIONAL RULES
The point of this conceptual analysis is not to justify every exercise
of state court jurisdiction that the concepts might embrace. Far from it.
42 Id. at 209.
43 Id. at 209-12.
44 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
45 See Barer v. Goldberg, 20 Wash. App. 472, 582 P.2d 868 (1978), and cases cited in note 26
supra.
46 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
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The point is only to show that these jurisdictional concepts can be used
to accommodate almost any set of results about jurisdiction that a dis-
criminating doctrinal artist might wish for. The important question,
then, is not what can be made of the concepts, but what should be
made of them-what the law of state court jurisdiction ought to be.
In part, the answer to this question depends upon the premises
from which one begins. One can start, for example, with something
like the following set of ideas: The federal union is made up of sepa-
rate states; the states are endowed severally with sovereign power to
administer civil justice; state sovereignty is delimited by state territory;
and only such matters as can be considered "within" the state's terri-
tory are within the state's judicial sovereignty. In this limited view of
things, the modem "minimum contacts", principle is merely a con-
straint on a theory of jurisdiction that is based on a concept of the states
as independent polities. The state court systems are thus to be autono-
mous, self-sufficient, self-regarding, and preoccupied with their sepa-
rate legal existence, even at the cost of being collectively ineffective to
dispose of complicated multistate cases.
On the other hand, one can view each state's court system as a
constituent of a national legal system whose common objective is to
supply an appropriate forum for every domestic case, however compli-
cated. Under this view, the proper measure of a state's judicial author-
ity is not what the state as an independent polity might legitimately do,
but what it ought to do in tacit collaboration with courts of other states
in order to establish a coherent national system of civil justice. Juris-
dictional theory, if bent to this task, would be informed by the venue
rules governing location of litigation that the states themselves have
established for their internal use and that Congress has established for
the federal court system.47 These rules usually specify that the location
of litigation shall be where at least one of the defendants resides, or
where the transaction arose, or, in the case of limited classes of pre-
sumptively disadvantaged plaintiffs, where the plaintiff resides. These
rules are also subject to the modifying rule that transfer may be made
to a more convenient place.48 In the interstate situation, that result can
be accomplished through the rule of forum non conveniens.
Thus, there is a choice among basic interpretations of the jurisdic-
tional problem. According to the interpretation advanced here, state
court territorial jurisdiction is essentially a problem of interstate venue.
In the opinion of state court judges of Walter Schaefer's stature, would
that be demeaning?
47 See also Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MICH. L. REv. 307
(1951).
48 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
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